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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID A. MAXWELL, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
ANGELINE D. MAXWELL, 
Defendant-Respondent• 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
CASE NO: 860267-CA 
PRIORITY NO: 14b 
Appeal from the Judgment of the District 
Court of Tooele County, State of Utah, 
Honorable John A. Rokich, Judge 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Judicial Code of the Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3 
entitled "Court of Appeals Jurisdiction" effective through 
December 31, 1987, states as follows: 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate 
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(g) appeals from district 
court involving domestic relations 
cases including, but not limited 
to, divorce, annulment, property 
division, child custody, support 
and visitation, adoption, and 
paternity; and ... 
-1-
This appeal is from the District Court of Tooele County 
and involves a domestic relations case, therefore, it is 
properly before this Court, which has appellate jurisdic-
tion. 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an action wherein the Plaintiff-Appellant, who 
was the husband, brought an action for divorce against the 
wife, who is the Defendant-Respondent, in the Third Judicial 
District Court of Tooele County, granting a Decree of 
Divorce to the parties and awarding one-half of Appellantfs 
military retirement to Respondent and alimony to Respondent, 
all from which the Appellant appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The issues presented by this appeal are: 
1. Did the Third Judicial District Court of Tooele 
County, State of Utah, retain jurisdiction over Appellant to 
make a "further determination" as to the issues of the 
retirement benefit division and alimony? 
2. Did the Court abuse its discretion in its judgment 
and order awarding one-half of Appellant's retirement 
benefits to Respondent? 
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3. Did the Court abuse its discretion in its judgment 
and order awarding Respondent $100.00 per month as and for 
alimony for an indeterminable period of time? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant and Respondent were married on the 23rd day 
of June, 1964, in Elko, Nevada, and there was born one (1) 
child of their marriage, to-wit: Natalie Nichole Maxwell, 
born on November 29, 1968. (R 5) The Appellant filed for 
divorce on June 24, 1983, in the Third Judicial District 
Court of Tooele County, State of Utah. (R 5) The attorney 
at that time representing Appellant was Kirk C. Lusty who 
obtained a Decree of Divorce for the Appellant on the 27th 
day of June, 1983, which was entered by the Honorable 
District Court Judge, Scott Daniels, on the 8th day of July, 
1983, settling all matters between the parties and awarding 
to the Respondent custody of the minor child and specific 
rights of visitation to the Appellant. The lower court 
further awarded to the Respondent the sum of $300.00 per 
month as and for child support for the minor child of the 
parties. No alimony was awarded to either party. Appellant 
was awarded his military retirement. (R 16,17) The divorce 
was to become effective ninety (90) days from the date of 
the hearing. (R 16) 
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Thereafter Defendant-Respondent filed a Motion to set 
aside the Decree of Divorce, which Motion was heard on the 
22nd day of August, 1983, pursuant to notice. (R 18) The 
Court entered its Order September 15, 1983, by and through 
the Honorable Judith M. Billings, Judge Presiding, following 
the hearing, which set aside portions of the previously 
entered Decree of Divorce concerning the parties1 property 
and alimony, and retaining the remainder of the Decree, 
including but not limited to, the divorce granted to Plain-
tiff and the child support granted to Defendant. (R 26,27) 
A trial on the issues raised by the Order that were set 
aside, including the parties' property and alimony, was to 
take place within ninety (90) days of the Order. (R 26) 
Concurrently the parties, by and through their respective 
attorneys, Kirk C. Lusty for Plaintiff, and Rick Higgins for 
Defendant, stipulated to a Motion to extend the time in 
which the Divorce Decree and the matter would become final 
from October 8, 1983 to January 1, 1984. (T 31) The 
Stipulation was so ordered and granted by the Tooele Dis-
trict Court on October 3, 1983, such that the Divorce Decree 
did not become final until January 1, 1984. (R 34) 
Thereafter on or about the 17th day of October, 1983, 
notice of a trial scheduled for November 21, 1983, had been 
sent to the respective parties1 counsel on the remaining 
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issues of property and alimony. (R 30) Thereafter the 
respective parties, by and through their counsel, did 
stipulate to a Motion to Continue before the Court for a 
continuance of the November 21, 1983, trial concerning the 
remaining issues of the property of the parties and alimony 
without date inasmuch as the parties were uncertain of the 
need of a trial or further litigation in the action. (R 
32,33) The lower Court on November 14, 1983, ordered that 
the trial currently set for November 21, 1983, be and was 
thereby continued without date, leaving counsel to certify 
when the matter was ready if a trial became necessary. (R 
32) 
In the meantime, Appellant accepted a job through the 
United States Air Force as an employer in Okinawa, Japan, in 
February of 1984. In September of 1984, Respondent moved to 
Okinawa, Japan, in an attempt to "reconcile". (Tr. 15) In 
February of 1985, the parties decided to proceed with a 
"full divorce" in Okinawa. (Tr. 15, 16) Respondent re-
tained an attorney in Okinawa and had divorce papers pre-
pared divorcing the parties and deciding all issues of 
property settlement and alimony. (Tr. 16, 29) Respondent 
then returned to the United States in January of 1986, and 
sometime thereafter retained present counsel for Respondent, 
M. Don Young, as her attorney, who entered his appearance as 
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her counsel on the 11th day of March, 1986, in this proceed-
ing, also requesting Appellant to obtain counsel for further 
proceedings in the Lower Court, sending notice to Appellant 
in Japan to appoint new counsel, even though Plaintiff's 
counsel had not withdrawn. (R 35,36,37) 
On the 2nd day of July, 1986, Respondent, by and 
through her attorney, filed a Motion for Sanctions for 
Appellant's failure to answer Respondent's Request for 
Production of Documents that was mailed to the Plaintiff in 
Okinawa, Japan. The Motion was noticed for hearing for the 
28th day of July, 1986. (R 54,55,56) Appellant replied by 
retaining Pete N. Vlahos to enter a Special Appearance ONLY 
for purposes of attacking jurisdiction and to dismiss the 
pending matters, and to dismiss the Motion for Sanctions 
based on the grounds of res judicata and lack of jurisdic-
tion. (R 62-67,75-77) 
On August 11, 1986, after a continuance was granted, (R 
80,21) the Honorable John A. Rokich, Judge Presiding, 
entered an Order and Finding on Plaintiff's Motion for 
Dismissal and Defendant's Motion for Sanctions, finding that 
the Lower Court had granted the parties a Decree of Divorce 
and any after-accruing Decree of Divorce without a remar-
riage had no validity or force or effect to grant the 
parties a divorce as the same had been granted and by virtue 
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of other Orders had become final on the 1st day of January, 
1984. (R 83-85) The Court further found that by virtue of 
the Order the Lower Court had reserved jurisdiction over the 
issues of property division and alimony, and ordered that 
the matter be set on the Court calendar for September 12, 
1986, for an evidentiary hearing to resolve the remaining 
issues of division of the parties1 property, including the 
division of Appellant's military retirement and whether and 
how much alimony should be awarded to the Respondent. (R 
83-85) 
The hearing was held on Friday, September 12, 1986
 f 
before the Honorable John A. Rokich, Judge Presiding. 
Testimony was proffered by the parties' respective counsel. 
(Tr. 13) Defendant was present, but the Plaintiff was 
unable to attend from Japan due to his employment and 
Plaintiff's counsel was denied an earlier request for 
continuance of the evidentiary hearing until the end of 
September, 1987 in order for Plaintiff to attend. (Tr. 13, 
27) 
Proffered testimony from Defendant indicated that the 
"marriage" started having problems and that Plaintiff 
insisted upon Defendant obtaining a divorce because Defen-
dant could not stay on base or continue with her job without 
some sort of divorce paperwork being processed or otherwise 
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she would have to return without a job to the United States. 
(Tr. 16) The parties then obtained a divorce in Japan 
through the services of a Japanese attorney. (Tr. 16) 
Defendant's attorney then proffered testimony that 
Defendant had consulted with the staff Judge Advocate at the 
Air Force Base in Okinawa indicating that by Defendant 
consenting to the divorce she would receive paperwork that 
would enable her to maintain separate housing but it would 
not affect any rights concerning the alimony or property 
division. (Tr. 17) Plaintiff's counsel was not given an 
opportunity to cross examine. Defendant's counsel further 
proffered testimony that the Plaintiff was in the military 
for 19 years of their marriage. (Tr. 22) Following the 
proffered testimony without cross examination, the lower 
Court ordered that Defendant was entitled to one-half of 
Plaintiff's military retirement but then reconsidered that 
order indicating that he would follow the formula estab-
lished by the Utah Supreme Court for award of military 
retirement benefits. (Tr. 33) ... but ultimately awarded to 
Defendant one-half of Plaintiff's military retirement 
benefits without reference to any type of formula. (R 87) 
Testimony was also proffered by Defendant's counsel in 
regards to an award of alimony to which the lower Court 
Judge responded that he was not inclined at this juncture to 
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make a substantial award of alimony, (Tr. 31) and ultimately 
awarded Defendant $100.00 per month for an indeterminable 
amount of time. (R 87) 
The lower Court's final judgment and order found that 
that Court had reserved and retained jurisdiction of the 
matters of property division including the Plaintiff's 
retirement and Defendant's right to alimony from Plaintiff, 
and that the purported Japanese divorce had no effect and 
was void ab initio because the Utah divorce had been entered 
in the matter and became final on January 1, 1984. (R 
92,93,94) The lower Court awarded to the Defendant 50% of 
the Plaintiff's disposable military retirement pay, paid 
directly to Defendant and further awarded to Defendant the 
sum of $100.00 per month as and for alimony. (R 92,93,94) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. 
The lower Court did not retain jurisdiction of Appel-
lant to make a further determination as to the issues of 
retirement and alimony. 
POINT IA. 
The principal of "Comity" denies the lower Court any 
further jurisdiction over Appellant or Respondent to make a 
further determination as to the issues of retirement and 
alimony because the foreign Court of Japan had already made 
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a final determination as to those issues and are entitled 
the doctrine of res judicata as much as any other foreign 
Decree. 
POINT IB. 
Appellant's counsel entered a Special Appearance solely 
for purposes of contesting jurisdiction and raising the 
affirmative defense of res judicata and not to litigate the 
issue of property division and alimony which were ultimately 
decided by the Court on September 12, 1986, constituting an 
abuse of discretion. 
POINT II, 
The lower Court abused its discretion and ruled con-
trary to Utah law in awarding to Respondent 50% of Appel-
lant's military retirement benefits, especially in light of 
the Woodward formula and a lack of evidence as to Appel-
lant's time in the military as compared to his time in the 
military while married. 
POINT III. 
The lower Court abused its discretion by awarding to 
the Respondent $100.00 per month as and for alimony for an 
indeterminable amount of time based on the needs of the 
spouse, her ability to work, and the ability of the paying 
spouse to pay the alimony. 
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ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT RETAIN JURISDIC-
TION OVER APPELLANT TO MAKE A "FURTHER 
DETERMINATION" AS TO THE ISSUES OF 
RETIREMENT AND ALIMONY. 
POINT IA. 
THE PRINCIPAL OF "COMITY" DENIES THE 
LOWER COURT ANY FURTHER JURISDICTION 
OVER APPELLANT OR RESPONDENT TO MAKE A 
"FURTHER DETERMINATION" AS TO THE ISSUES 
OF RETIREMENT AND ALIMONY. 
The Court of Appeals of the State of Oregon in the case 
of^Redfox and Redfox, 542 P.2d 918 (Or. App. 1975) held that 
a divorce consummated in an Indian tribal court although not 
entitled to the same "full faith and credit" accorded 
decrees rendered in sister states, was "entitled to the same 
deference shown decisions of foreign nations as a matter of 
comity". That Court further held as follows: 
The rule of general application is that 
a judgment rendered by a court of a 
foreign nation is entitled to recogni-
tion to the same extent and with as 
broad a scope as it has by law or usage 
in the courts of jurisdiction where 
rendered if: (1) the foreign court 
actually had jurisdiction over both the 
subject matter and the parties; (2) the 
decree was not obtained fraudulently; 
(3) the decree was rendered under a 
system of law reasonably assuring the 
requisites of an impartial adminis-
tration of justice - due notice and a 
hearing; and (4) the judgment did not 
contravene the public policy of the 
jurisdiction in which it is relied upon. 
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The Appellant and the Respondent in order to once and 
for all finally terminate any relation they had between 
themf and make a final disposition of all claims between 
them, sought a divorce in the foreign courts of the nation 
of Japan with assistance of a Japanese attorney and the 
Staff Judge Advocate with the United States Air Force 
stationed in Japan. Respondent retained the attorney. 
Affidavits and documents submitted by Appellant's counsel in 
the lower Court, particularly a letter from Respondent's 
attorney in Japan, Mr. Makoto Tanizoe, indicates that the 
Respondent hired him herein and was the petitioner in the 
foreign divorce action and that Respondent was repeatedly 
asked about any and all desires she had at that time in 
regards to any alimony or monetary claims that she had from 
the Appellant in this action, David A. Maxwell. 
In her response to her Japanese attorney's request and 
repeated questions by the Judge as to whether or not there 
were any other conditions she would like to ask the Court, 
aside from the stipulations and the mutual consent agree-
ment, the Appellant and Respondent on April 1, 1985, mutual-
ly consented that both parties waived any alimony or mone-
tary claims from each other, including Appellant's military 
retirement benefits which is property. 
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The lower Court in 1983 at Respondent's request and by 
and through her attorney at that time, was granted a Motion 
to Set Aside the Decree of Divorce allowing her to proceed 
contrary to her previous wishes, for a portion of the 
property of the parties including Appellant's military 
retirement benefits and alimony. Thereafter in April of 
1985, for a second time, Respondent after consultation with 
her Japanese attorney and repeated questioning by the 
Japanese Judge, consented to waive any rights in alimony or 
any other monetary claims that she may have had against 
Appellant David A. Maxwell. Respondent through proffered 
testimony indicated in the trial record pages 16 and 17, 
that both her Japanese attorney and the Judge Advocate 
indicated that the divorce in Japan would have no effect on 
any rights concerning the alimony or property division 
because the Japanese Court had no jurisdiction over them. 
The mutual consent agreement presented to the Japanese Court 
and reviewed by its Judge, and the letter from Respondent's 
attorney as Petitioner, indicate exactly to the contrary 
that alimony and any monetary claims were settled by that 
Court. 
Approximately one (1) year after the Japanese divorce, 
Respondent returns to the United States, hires another 
attorney in Tooele County and again pursues a division of 
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the property and claims of alimony against the Appellant 
asking the lower Court to void and declare null any and all 
proceedings held in the foreign Court to which she had fully 
consented and actually petitioned the Court there for a 
determination as to alimony and monetary claims. 
Once again, the Respondent is in effect asking the 
lower Court in this matter to set aside a Decree of Divorce 
that has made a further determination as to alimony and 
monetary claims between the parties, having changed her mind 
once again, and requesting alimony and a division of all 
marital properties almost three (3) years after the parties 
determined that a trial would not be necessary to settle 
those issues in the lower Court because they would be 
resolved between the parties. 
"Comity" is simply a recognition that one nation allows 
within its territory to the legislative, executive or 
judicial acts of another nation, having due regard to both 
international duty and convenience, and to their rights of 
its own citizens or other persons who are under the pro-
tection of its laws as stated in Redfox and Redfox, supra, 
at 921. The requirements of comity have been met in this 
matter, both parties were on notice and mutually agreed to 
the effects of the foreign Decree settling the issue of 
alimony and monetary claims, and for the lower Court to deny 
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or declare that Decree void ab initio as to all aspects is a 
clear abuse of the lower Court's discretion and denies the 
application and principle of comity as accorded to foreign 
nations. 
POINT IB. 
APPELLANT'S COUNSEL ENTERED A SPECIAL 
APPEARANCE SOLELY FOR PURPOSES OF 
CONTESTING JURISDICTION AND NOT TO 
LITIGATE THE ISSUES OF PROPERTY DIVISION 
AND ALIMONY. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Dennett v. 
Powers, 536 P.2d 135 (Utah 1975) , held that the Defendants 
did not reconfer jurisdiction on the Court when they ap-
peared specially by counsel to move that a Complaint be 
dismissed. 
In the instant case, Appellant retained the services of 
Pete N. Vlahos to enter his Special Appearance to attack the 
grounds of jurisdiction over the Appellant and assert the 
defense of res judicata in that the issue of alimony and 
monetary claims had been previously decided by a foreign 
Court. The lower Court after denying Appellant's counsel's 
request for a continuance so that Appellant could be in 
attendance at a later hearing, continued its appearance at 
the September 12, 1986, hearing to continue to contest 
jurisdiction and assert the defense of res judicata only on 
a Special Appearance basis. The lower Court found at that 
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hearing that the foreign Decree was void ab initio, finding 
the Court had jurisdiction over the Appellant, and then 
further found that Respondent was entitled to one-half of 
Appellant's military retirement and $100.00 per month as and 
for alimony. The Court had stated at the conclusion of the 
August 11, 1986, hearing on Appellant's Motion to Dismiss 
and Defendant's Motion for Sanctions, that the Court wanted 
to know the facts with regard to what was done in the 
Okinawa proceeding so that he could know whether or not 
Respondent had at any time before the Court said "I waive 
all my rights and any I may have with regards [to alimony or 
Appellant's military retirement benefits]". The Court 
further indicated that if at any time they agreed to waive 
all of that then the Court could see no way that he could 
impose sanctions and that the lower Court didn't think it 
could make a ruling without knowing all of the facts in the 
case. The Court then continued the matter to September 12, 
1986, for a determination as to those motions and not for a 
determination as to an actual division of the property and 
alimony. 
The lower Court abused its discretion in assuming it 
had jurisdiction to award a property division and alimony to 
Respondent at the September 12, 1986, hearing when Appellant 
was not present in person and was only represented by 
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counsel on a Special Appearance basis to contest jurisdic-
tion and raise the defense of res judicata. 
POINT II. 
THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
AND RULED CONTRARY TO UTAH LAW IN 
AWARDING TO RESPONDENT 50% OF APPEL-
LANT'S MILITARY RETIREMENT BENEFITS. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Woodward v. 
Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), held in regards to a 
division of government retirement benefits at page 433 
through 434 as follows: 
"... Thus, the wife is entitled to share 
in that portion of the benefits to which 
the rights accrued during the mar-
riage. .. 
The order should be modified for 
the wife to receive one-half of the 
benefits accrued during the marriage, 
regardless of the length of time the 
husband continues in the same employ-
ment. [Emphasis added] Whenever the 
husband choses to terminate his govern-
ment employment, the marital property 
subject to distribution is a portion of 
the retirement benefits represented by 
the number of years of the marriage 
divided by the number of the years of 
the husband's employment. The wife is 
entitled to one-half of that portion 
pursuant to the award of the trial judge 
in this case, which our modification is 
intended to sustain." 
In the instant case, testimony was proffered to the 
Court that the parties were married during 19 years of the 
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total time Appellant spent in the military. No evidence was 
taken under oath and no cross examination was allowed. The 
record is void as to the actual amount of time the Appellant 
spent in the military, which is presumably more than the 19 
years because 20 years are required for retirement and may 
have been considerably more than that time period, but 
because of the lower Court's refusal to allow continuance of 
the matter until such time as the Appellant could appear in 
person, and again, contrary to the Special Appearance basis 
of Appellant's counsel, neither the lower Court nor this 
Court could use the Woodward formula to calculate the actual 
military retirement benefits to which the Respondent would 
be entitled. 
The lower Court indicated at the time of the September 
12, 1986, hearing on page 33 of the trial record, that he 
would make an Order entitling Respondent to one-half and 
then he rephrased it indicating "I think there's a formula 
for that case, a formula with regard to division", and that 
the lower Court Judge would consider that formula referring 
to the Woodward case in making an award of the retirement 
benefits. 
Ultimately the lower Court Judge rendered a Minute 
Entry at page 87 of the record by simply awarding Respondent 
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one-half of the retirement of Appellant without any refer-
ence to a formula. 
The lower Court's decision awarding one-half of Appel-
lant's retirement to Respondent without reference to the 
formula or the Woodward case is contrary to well established 
law and clearly an abuse of discretion of the Court and 
should be reversed and remanded to the lower Court for 
further testimony to properly establish a formula, 
POINT III. 
THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 
AWARDING TO THE RESPONDENT $100.00 PER 
MONTH AS AND FOR ALIMONY FOR AN INDETER-
MINABLE AMOUNT OF TIME. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Jeppson v. 
Jeppson, 684 P.2d 69 (Utah 1984) , held that the criteria to 
be considered in awarding alimony include: 
The financial conditions and needs of 
the wife, considering her station in 
life; her ability to produce sufficient 
income for herself; and the ability of 
the husband to provide support. 
The recent Utah Supreme Court case of Paffel v. Paffel, 732 
P.2d 96 (Utah 1986), reiterated this by stating the follow-
ing: 
"In deciding whether or not to award 
spousal support and, if so, in what 
amount, the trial court must consider 
the financial condition and needs of the 
spouse claiming support, the ability of 
that spouse to provide sufficient income 
for him or herself, and the ability of 
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the responding spouse to provide the 
support. Failure to consider these 
factors constitutes an abuse of dis-
cretion. " 
There is no testimony proffered or on record indicating 
what the actual income of the Appellant is other than that 
offered by Respondent. Appellant's counsel did request a 
continuance of the September 12th hearing until the end of 
September at which time Appellant could be present in person 
to testify, but that request for continuance was denied. 
This left the Court with the proffered testimony of the 
Respondent .as to her income and the estimated and guessed 
income of the Appellant. 
The Respondent, through her attorney, proffered testi-
mony that her income was $1,555.73 gross with a net income 
of $1,137.28. (Tr. 18) She had also worked for a period of 
26 years. (Tr. 21) Respondent was only 49 years of age and 
though she was suffering from certain nervous and psycho-
logical disorders, she was currently employed. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Delatore v. 
Delatore, 680 P.2d 27 (Utah 1984), held that an award to the 
Plaintiff-wife of $200.00 per month alimony for a period of 
24 months was not an abuse of discretion and affirmed that 
order. That case involved a Defendant husband who had been 
employed with the same employer for 34 years, had gained 
valuable seniority, and at the time of the trial was making 
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approximately $27,200.00 annually in gross wages, and 
additionally had minor sources of additional income from the 
sale of property and rents. The Defendant-wife was found to 
be employable and in fact had been employed during part of 
the marriage, but at the time she was unemployed and was 
suffering from several health problems. During the marriage 
one of her kidneys had been removed, she was presently under 
a doctor's care for disorders in the other kidney and her 
stomach, she had no medical or hospital insurance, she had 
no place of her own to live and was residing with one of her 
children. She did anticipate obtaining employment but at 
her last job had earned only $4.25 per hour and the award of 
alimony of $200.00 per month for two (2) years was given to 
her to cushion her return to employment and self-sustaining 
status. 
In the instant case, the Appellant/husband has also 
been employed for several years, has an income annually as 
well as a pension income from military retirement. The 
Respondent is presently working, is only 49 years of age, 
and has health problems as did the Plaintiff in Delatore. 
Additionally, the Respondent in this case is employed, has a 
gross income of over $1,500.00 per month and is not working 
for $4.25 per hour. 
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The lower Court has abused its discretion in failing to 
consider all three (3) factors in arriving at a decision as 
to alimony. The lower Court failed to properly consider the 
ability of the Respondent to provide sufficient income for 
herself, and especially in light of an award of one-half of 
the Appellant's military retirement benefits. Therefore the 
decision to award $100.00 per month as and for alimony to 
the Respondent for an indeterminable amount of time should 
be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted to this Honorable Court that the 
husband has suffered a clear abuse of discretion of the 
Court as evidenced by the judgment of the Court as set forth 
hereinabove in this brief. This Court also has an 
obligation to extend the principal of "comity" to a foreign 
nation, especially under the circumstances where' the parties 
as citizens of this country with the intention of settling 
any and all claims to alimony and other monetary aspects in 
good faith consulted foreign divorce Court with counsel from 
a local Japanese attorney and assistance from a U.S. Judge 
Advocate. To decide otherwise would be to deny well estab-
lished principals of "comity". The Appellant appeared 
before this Court through his counsel only on a Special 
Appearance basis to contest jurisdiction and argue a defense 
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of res judicata, while the lower Court declared the foreign 
Decree void ab initio, and further, determination in the 
absence of Appellant after having requested a continuance 
until Appellant could be present in person, awarded one-half 
of Appellant's military retirement benefits contrary to 
existing State law without the use of a formula or the 
figures to use in that formula, and further abused its 
discretion in awarding to Respondent $100.00 per month as 
and for alimony for an indeterminate amount of time when the 
Respondent was capable of employment, was employed, had an 
income and was only 49 years of age. 
The decision of the lower Court due to its abuse of 
discretion should be reversed, or in the very least, remand-
ed to the lower Court for further testimony and a proper 
determination as to military retirement benefits and alimony 
if this Court should fail to recognize the mutually agreed 
to foreign Decree as having been a final determination as to 
alimony and any monetary claims the parties had between 
them. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ day of September, 
1987. 
VLAHOS & SHARP 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this y day of September, 
1987, I mailed four (4) true and correct copies of the above 
and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT by placing same in the U.S. 
Mail postage prepaid and addressed to the following: 
M. Don Young 
MOHLMAN & YOUNG 
Attorney for Respondent 
250 South Main Street 
Tooele, Utah 84074 
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ADDENDUM 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law attached. 
Order and Judgment attached. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
— o o O o o — 
DAVID A. MAXWELL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ANGELINE B. MAXWELL, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 83-224 
— o o O o o — 
This matter came on for hearing before the Honorable John A. Rokich, 
Judge of the above-entitled Court on the 12th day of September, 1986, the Court 
having previously entered its Findings and Order that the above-entitled Court 
reserved and retained jurisdiction of the matters of property division including 
the plaintiff's retirement and the defendant's right to alimony from the 
plaintiff and that a purported Japanese divorce had no effect and was void ab» 
initio because the Utah divorce which was entered in the above-entitled matter 
was entered and became final 1st day of January, 1984 which was prior to the 
purported Japanese divorce; which later Japanese divorce was unecessary because 
the parties never remarried after the Utah divorce. However, because the Utah 
Court had not resolved the issues of property and alimony and retaining and 
reserving jurisdiction of these issues, these issues had to be resolved by the 
above-entitled Court, for which purpose this hearing had been scheduled. The 
plaintiff was not present but was represented by F. Kim Waipoe, Esq., for and in 
behalf of Pete N. Vlahos. The defendant was present and represented by M. Don 
Young. Both counsels proferred testimony and made argument and being fully 
advised in the premises, the Court enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The plaintiff1s present address is: Kadena Air Base; Okinawa, 
Japan; PSC1 Box 28102; APO San Francisco 96230; and his Social Security Number 
is 459-62-3001. 
! 2. The defendant's present address is: P.O. Box 288; Eureka, Utah 
J 84628. 
3. The plaintiff and defendant were married at Elko, Elko County, 
Nevada on the 23rd day of June, 1964 and their divorce became final on the 1st 
day of January, 1984, but, though granting a divorce, the Court previously had 
not resolved the issues of property division and alimony and the Court retained 
!jurisdiction of these matters to resolve them. 
I 4. During the course of the marriage, the plaintiff served 
|approximately nineteen years in military service and retired from military 
[service shortly before the divorce of the parties became final. The plaintiff 
'qualified for and accumulated military retirement benefits as a result of 
2 
(serving twenty or more years in military service^ 
5. Said military retirement benefits, as allowed by federal law, are 
marital property subject to division by the above-entitled Court. 
6. It is fair and equitable that, pursuant to federal law and state 
law, that the defendant should be awarded fifty percent (50%) of the plaintiff's 
disposable military retirement pay and that the same should be paid directly to 
the defendant from the appropriate military service finance center as allowed bw 
federal law in the case of a military service marriage in excess of ten years as 
this marriage was, 
7. The Court further finds that the defendant has serious medical 
problems including chronic bulimia and chronic anexoria nervosa that are likely 
to require continued medical attention which may in the future jeopardize her 
employment. However, at the present time, the defendant has a good job with a 
gross income from her employment of $1,555.03 per month. Based on the fact that 
this is a long-term marriage and on defendant's present income, the Court should 
award the defendant the nominal sum of $100.00 per month as and for alimony with] 
the possibility that the same may be modified or terminated in the future 
i|depending on the circumstances of the parties. 
From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court issues the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The defendant should be awarded fifty percent (50%) of the 
plaintiff, David A. Maxwell's, disposable military retirement pay and the same 
<J4*YOrNO 
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should be paid directly to her by the appropriate military financial center as 
follows: Angeline B. Maxwell, P.O. Box 288, Eureka, Utah 84628 or such other 
address as she shall designate from time to timel 
2. The plaintiff should be further ordered to pay to the defendant the 
sum of $100,00 per month as and for alimony, the same to be due and payable on 
or about the 1st day of each month with the first payment due on or about the 
1st day of October, 1986. 
Dated this /S day of October, 1986. 
BY THE COURT 
A 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing to Pete N. 
Vlahos, Vlahos & Sharp, 2447 Kiesel Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401, this ^ 4 ^ day 
of September, 1986. 
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M. DON YOUNG - #3594 
MOHLMAN AND YOUNG 
Attorneys for Defendant 
250 South Main Street 
Tooele, Utah 84074 
Telephone: 882-1618 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
— o o O o o — 
DAVID A. MAXWELL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ANGELINE B. MAXWELL, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Ci^il No. 83-224 
—-00O00 — 
This matter came on for hearing before the Honorable John A. Rokich, 
Judge of the above-entitled Court on the 12th day of September, 1986, the Court 
having previously entered its Findings and Order that the above-entitled Court 
reserved and retained jurisdiction of the matters of property division including 
the plaintiff's retirement and the defendant's right to alimony from the 
plaintiff and that a purported Japanese divorce had no effect and was void £b 
initio because the Utah divorce which was entered in the above-entitled matter 
was entered and became final 1st day of January, 1984 which was prior to the 
purported Japanese divorce; which later Japanese divorce was unecessary because 
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the parties never remarried after the Utah divorce. However, because the Utah 
Court had not resolved the issues of property and alimony and retaining and 
reserving jurisdiction of these issues, these issues had to be resolved by the 
above-entitled Court, for which purpose this hearing had been scheduled. The 
plaintiff was not present but was represented by F. Kim Walpoe, Esq., for and inj 
behalf of Pete N. Vlahos. The defendant was present and represented by M. Don 
Young. Both counsels proferred testimony and made argument and being fully 
advised in the premises, and the Court having heretofore entered U s Findings of| 
Fact and Conclusions of law, it is: 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
1. The defendant is awarded fifty percent (50%) of the plaintiff, 
David A. Maxwell's, disposable military retirement pay and the same is to be 
paid directly to her by the appropriate military financial center as follows: 
Angeline B.JIaxwell, P.O. Box 288, Eureka, Utah 84628 or such other address as 
she shall designate from time to time. 
2. The plaintiff is further ordered to pay to the defendant the sum of 
$100.00 per month as and for alimony, the same to be due and payable on or about 
the 1st day of each month with the first payment due on or about the 1st day of 
October, 1986. 
Dated this / day of October, 1986. 
BY THE COURT 
JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing to Pete N. 
Vlahos, Vlahos & Sharp, 2447 Kiesel Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401, this e^/^-day 
of September, 1986. 
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